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a b s t r a c t
Even though course timetabling and student scheduling problems have been studied
extensively, not much has been done for the optimization of student add/drop requests
after the initial registration period. Add/drop registrations are usually processed with a
first come first served policy. This, however, can introduce inefficiencies and dead-locks
resulting in add/drop requests that are not satisfied even though they can, in fact, be
satisfied. We model the course add/drop process as a direct bartering problem in which
add/drop requests appear as bids. We formulate the resulting problem as an integer linear
program. We show that our problem can be solved polynomially as a minimum cost flow
network problem. In our model, we also introduce a two-level weighting system that
enables students to express priorities among their requests.We demonstrate improvement
in the satisfaction of students over the currently used model and also the fast performance
of our algorithms on various test cases based on real-life registration data of our university.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In universities, course timetabling (CT), student scheduling (SS) and add/drop processes involve the coordination of
various resources and entities. CT basically deals with the allocation of time slots and classrooms to courses by taking into
consideration issues such as preferences of instructors and classroom locations. Given a timetable, in SS phase, students
select courses according to their needs and preferences. Because of course and section quota restrictions or enrollment
balancing requirements among the sections, it is not possible to satisfy the needs and preferences of all the students.
Therefore, some policy or algorithmneeds to be employed in SS phase for the assignment of students to courses and sections.
During the add/drop phase, a readjustment of the assignment solution in SS phase basically takes place by the addition,
dropping and swapping of courses and/or sections. In the literature, phases CT and SS have been extensively studied (see,
for example, surveys [6,7,20,27]). Some approaches tackled either CT or SS exclusively. Some approaches coupled these two
phases and solved the combined course timetabling and student scheduling problem. In this paper, our focus will be on the
add/drop process. Not much has been done for this phase—we are aware of only one work (that of Graves et al.’s [14]) that
addresses the add/drop process. The add/drop process has an important difference from that of CT and SS. A student may
have been already assigned to a seat in a course or section from SS phase and he may want to swap (barter) this seat that
he owns with another seat owned by other students in another course or section. Hence, one can say that whereas CT and
SS phases can be modeled as an assignment problem, for add/drop process bartering is a more appropriate model.
We were motivated to develop a direct barter model for the add/drop process because of some problems we noticed
during add/drop periods at our Boğaziçi University. Since 1998, web based online registration system has been used for
course registration [5]. Before the beginning of each semester, students are admitted to the system and are allowed to take
courses if both prerequisites of the courses are satisfied and the quotas of the courses permit. The system works on a first
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Fig. 1. Example problem for illustrating add, drop, and barter bids.
come first served (FCFS) policy basis and at the beginning of each registration period, a race occurs among students for
popular courses. Generally, the quotas of the popular courses are filled within the first few hours of online registration
period. After the registration period, the semester begins and during the first week of the semester, the students attend and
evaluate their courses. At the end of this week, add/drop period of one week begins and the students are allowed to change
their courses and/or sections of their courses. Because of the FCFS basis of the system and the quota restrictions, when a
student drops a course, he may not be able to take it again. This situation forces a student who wants to change his course,
to first try to add a new course, and then drop the old course. Although this does not pose a problem if the quotas of the
courses are not full, it does pose a problem for the popular courses. It is observed in Boğaziçi University student registration
system that the current FCFS based system causes deadlock situations, and hence reduces the total satisfaction of students.
Although different implementations of FCFS approach exist in different registration systems, all FCFS based systems are
prone to the same problem. For instance, in UniTime [21,29], which is an open source enterprise system for automated
construction of course timetables and student schedules, when a student wants to add a course which is not available, the
student is assigned to thewait-list of that course.Wait-lists are processed automatically in FCFSmanner as one seat becomes
available for the corresponding course. Therefore, since a student who wants to change his course cannot be sure whether
he would be assigned to the new course, he would not want to drop the course he has already assigned until he obtains a
seat in the new course. Thus, this would also lead to the same problem.
In order to increase the efficiency of add/drop process compared to the current FCFS based system of our university, a
direct bartermodel for the course add/dropprocess is proposed. The objective of themodel is to increase the total satisfaction
of students while preserving fairness among them. For this purpose, along with the usual add and drop requests, this model
allows students to barter the courses they want to drop for the courses they want to add. Students express their requests
through submitting multiple add, drop and barter bids and in each add and barter bid, they can declare a set of alternative
courses to be added. Besides, in this model, they can indicate relative priorities of their bids and the courses they want to
register for. For instance, if a student prefers course A over course B, and course B over course C , he just declares A ≻ B ≻ C .
Furthermore, students can request the same course or the same set of courses inmultiple bids and can also declare restriction
sets in which only one course can be added to the schedule.
In this paper, we contribute a formal development of the model. We present a network flow based algorithm that allows
us to solve the problems in strongly polynomial time. We also compare the solutions of our model with that of the FCFS
approach based on real-world student registration data and present the performance of our algorithms on various tests.
In the next section,we present an examplewithwhichwe explain ourmodel for the course add/drop process. In Section 3,
we formally define and formulate our model using integer programming. Then, in Section 4 we present a minimum cost
network flow solution of our problemand in Section 5,we present the experimental results. A reviewof the related literature
is given in Section 6. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 7.
2. A motivational example and the model
In this sectionwepresent an example scenario for add/drop process onwhichwe explain our direct bartermodel. Assume
that during the registration period, students Ali, Mehmet, Ayşe and Aslı have been registered for courses STS 401.01, SOC
101.01, ESC 301.01 and SOC 101.01 respectively. Murat, on the other hand, has been registered for both STS 401.02 and PSY
101.01. Suppose that during the add/drop period, the students declare add, drop, and barter bids as shown in Fig. 1.
Bids 1–5 are examples of a barter bid. In a barter bid, the left hand side of the arrow indicates the course to be dropped
and the right hand side indicates the course to be added. A barter bid as the name suggests enforces the student to drop the
course on the left hand side if he adds the new course on the right hand side. For instance, in bid 3 Ayşe wants to drop ESC
301.01 if she could add SOC 101.01 to her course list. Bids 6 and 7 are examples of an add bid. An add bid states that the
student wants to add the course on the right hand side without dropping any other course. Likewise, a drop bid, e.g. bid 8,
states that the student wants to drop the course on the left hand side without adding any other course.
Bids 1, 4 and 6 are different from the others in terms of having a request set of more than one course on the right hand
side. These bids are calledmulti-bids. Amulti-barter bid states that the student is indifferent, at least to some degree, to the
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set of requested courses and he is willing to drop the course on the left hand side if he could add any one of the courses in
this set. Similarly, a multi-add bid states that the student wants to add any one of the courses in this set without dropping
any other course. Since drop bids are not restricted with quota constraints, they should always be satisfied. Therefore, we
do not need to explicitly incorporate multi-drop bids in the model.
Multi-bids can be considered as combinations of two or more single bids which are XOR’ed. For instance, in bid 1, Ali
wants to add either PSY 101.01 or STS 401.02 but not both and drop STS 401.01 on the condition that his add request is
satisfied. This bid can be represented as a combination of two XOR’ed bids, STS 401.01 →{PSY 101.01} and STS 401.01
→ {STS 401.02}. Bid 1 is satisfied if exactly one of these bids is satisfied. By introducing multi-barter bids, without losing
generality, we can now safely assume that there are no two barter bids of a student that have the same course on the left
hand side since such bids can be combined and represented as one multi-barter bid. In addition to the multi-barter bid
mechanism, the model allows a student to mark a barter bid (either single or multi-barter) as drop-unless-barter meaning
that the student wants to drop the course on the left hand side if bartering of this course for another course in the request
set is not possible. In the given example, it is indicated using a star above the arrow of the bid 5. In this bid, Murat wants
to barter PSY 101.01 for ESC 301.01 and if ESC 301.01 cannot be added, Murat wants to drop PSY 101.01. Again, by further
introducing drop-unless-barter mechanism, drop and barter requests can be combined and again without losing generality,
we can state that there cannot be any two bids of a student that have the same course on the left hand side.
The add/drop process based on the direct barter model is a batch process and consists of two phases, a bid submission
phase in which the students are allowed to submit bids to the system or retract bids from the system and a solution phase in
which the optimum solution is calculated. Depending on the duration of the add/drop period, these phases can be repeated
as many times as necessary. For instance, for each day of the add/drop period, the bids can be collected from the students
throughout the day and the solution can be calculated at the end of the day and announced to the students afterwards.
Expressing preferences—weighted model
Although the described unweighted model helps to increase the total satisfaction of students, it can further be improved
by assigning weights to the bids. In the weighted model, add, drop, and barter bids are defined respectively as follows:
c∅
wi−→ {(ai1, wi1), (ai2, wi2), . . . , (aip, wip)}
di
wi−→ {(c∅, 0)}
di
wi−→ {(ai1, wi1), (ai2, wi2), . . . , (aip, wip)}
where i is the index of the bid,wi is the weight of the bid i, and di is the course to be dropped. c∅ denotes the null course used
for representing the course to be dropped or added for add and drop bids respectively. In the weighted model, weights are
assigned not only to the bids, but also to the requested courses. Therefore, the request set contains tuples (aij, wij)where aij
is the requested course,wij is the associated weight, and p is the number of the requested courses.
By assigningweights to the bids and the requested courses, themodel becomesmore powerful in the sense that it enables
students to express their preferences inside the bids. For instance,weight values canbe assigned to a student’s bids indicating
thedegree of his preferences for his bids. Theweight of themost favoredbidwould be thehighest and the least favoredwould
be the lowest. Likewise, for each multi-bid, weight values can also be assigned to the requested courses in the request set if
he is not totally indifferent to these courses. Considering the quota restrictions and the submitted bids, among the possible
courses in the request set, the one with the highest weight would be added to the student’s course list. Besides the ability
to express preferences among the bids and the requested courses, the weighted model also enables favoring some students
over others. Special students such as graduating students can also be favored officially by their department by increasing or
maximizing the weights of their bids. This will ensure that if the quotas of the courses are available then these students will
be the first to add the courses they want. Similarly, using the same mechanism, successful students, i.e. the students with
higher grade point average (GPA), can also be favored depending on the policy of the university.
3. Formulation of the model
The weighted direct barter model is formally defined as follows: let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} be the set of m courses and
Q = (qc1 , qc2 , . . . , qcm) be the tuple of remaining quotas where qck is the remaining quota of course ck (1 ≤ k ≤ m, qck ∈
Z+∪{0}). Let S = {s1, s2, . . . , st} be the set of t students.Wedefine Bl as the set of bids submitted by a student sl and the set of
all bids, B, is defined as B =tl=1 Bl. Each bid is denoted by a triplet, bi = (di, wi, Ri), where di is the course to be dropped for
barter and drop bids or the null course, c∅, for add bids (di ∈ C∪{c∅}), wi ∈ R+ is theweight and Ri is the request set of the bid
bi. The request set of a bid is either {(c∅, 0)} for drop bids or a set of two tuples, Ri = {(ai1, wi1), (ai2, wi2), . . . , (aip, wip)}, for
barter and add bids. Each tuple (aij, wij) in Ri indicates the requested course, that is the course to be added, and the associated
weight respectively (aij ∈ C, wij ∈ R+). Finally, the set D ⊆ B denotes the bids which are marked as drop-unless-barter.
A bid bi is called satisfiable if at least one of the courses in the request set has one or more remaining quota or there
exists at least one satisfiable bid whose course to be dropped is in the request set of bi. Formally, given bi = (di, wi, Ri)
and bl = (dl, wl, Rl) the following predicate is true: ∀i (satisfiable (bi) ⇔ ∃j ((aij, wij) ∈ Ri ∧ ((qaij ∈ Q ∧ qaij >
0) ∨ ∃l (satisfiable (bl) ∧ dl = aij)))).
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By the definition, all drop bids are satisfiable. The objective of themodel is to find the set of satisfiable bids thatmaximizes
the sum of the weights, that is the sum of both bid weights and weights of the requested courses, and hence the total
satisfaction of students.
In order to formulate the model using integer programming, two binary variables are introduced. The binary decision
variable x determines the satisfied bids and y determines the requested course which is added if the corresponding bid is
satisfied. Formally,
xi =

1, if bid i is satisfied
0, otherwise and yij =

1, if course aij is added for bid i
0, otherwise.
It should be noted that for a drop-unless-barter bid bi, the meaning of satisfaction is slightly different. xi = 0 means that
the student drops the course without adding any other course and xi = 1 means that the student barters the course for
another course. The integer programming formulation of the model is as follows:
maximize
−
∀i|bi∈B
wi xi + α · −
∀j|(aij,wij)∈Ri
wijyij
 (1)
subject to
−
∀i|bi∈(B\D)∧di=ck
xi −
−
∀i,j|bi∈B∧(aij,wij)∈Ri∧aij=ck
yij ≥ −

qck +
−
∀i|bi∈D∧di=ck
1

(∀k | ck ∈ C) (2)
xi −
−
∀j|(aij,wij)∈Ri
yij = 0 (∀i | bi ∈ B ∧ Ri ≠ {(c∅, 0)}) (3)
xi = 1 (∀i | bi ∈ B ∧ Ri = {(c∅, 0)}) (4)−
∀i,j|bi∈Bl∧(aij,wij)∈Ri∧aij=ck
yij ≤ 1 (∀k, l | ck ∈ C ∧ sl ∈ S) (5)
xi, yij ∈ {0, 1} (∀i, j). (6)
Note that in this formulation, the objective line in Eq. (1) maximizes the sum of the bid weights and the weights of
the courses in the request sets. In this equation, α factor is a constant positive number to be determined according to the
actual weight values and the number of bids which is described in the next section. Eq. (2) enforces quota restrictions of the
courses. For each course, the number of students dropping the course (including the drop and drop-unless-barter bids) plus
the remaining quota of the course should be greater than or equal to the number of students who added the course. Eq. (3)
expresses the satisfaction criterion: an add bid or a barter bid is satisfied if exactly one of the courses in the request set is
added. Eq. (4) ensures that all the drop bids are satisfied. Finally, Eq. (5) prevents students from adding the same course to
their schedule more than once.
3.1. Determining the weight values and the α factor
The main objective of the direct barter model is to increase the total satisfaction of students while preserving fairness
among them. In this section, we propose amethod for defining the parameters of themodel, that are the weights of the bids,
wi, the weights of the requested courses,wij, and the α factor, in accordance with this objective.
In this method, each student, sl, is responsible for ranking his bids according to his preference instead of defining the
actual weights of the bids. Based on this ranking, he constructs his preference list, a permutation of his bids sorted in
descending order of his preference. Then, this preference list is used as Bl, the set of bids submitted by the student sl. So, in
the set Bl = {b(1)l , b(2)l , . . . , b(u)l }, the bid b(1)l is the most preferred bid with highest rank number of 1 and the bid b(u)l is the
least preferred bid with the lowest rank number of u (i.e. ∀l : b(1)l ≻ b(2)l ≻ . . . ≻ b(u)l ). Note that, for this definition we use
a different indexing scheme for referring the bids in the set Bl in order to prevent confusion with the indexing scheme for
referring the bids in the bid set B. Subscript of a bid denotes the owner of the bid and the superscript, which is the index
number in the set Bl, denotes the rank of the bid. We also denote the weight of a bid b
(r)
l withw
(r)
l . Given the ordered set of
bids Bl of the student sl, the weight of a bid b
(r)
l is defined as follows:
w
(r)
l = 2h−r (∀l, r | b(r)l ∈ Bl). (7)
In this function, h is the index of the lowest ranked bid among all the bids, and therefore the minimum bid weight value,
wmin is 1. This function ensures that the weights of the bids that have the same rank among the students are equal and for
each bid b(r)l ∈ Bl, the weight of the bid is greater than the sum of the weights of the lower ranked bids in the same set.
Therefore, this bid weight function enables the model to satisfy as many higher ranked bids as possible while preserving
fairness among the students.
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Defining theweight values for the requested courses is straightforward. As for the bids, each student declares the courses
in the request set such that the more preferred course comes before the less preferred course (i.e. ∀i | bi ∈ B : ai1 ≻ ai2 ≻
· · · ≻ aip). Since for each bid at most one requested course can be added to the students schedule in the optimum solution,
the only requirement for weights of the requested courses is to ensure that the more preferred requested course has higher
weight value than that of the less preferred course. Therefore, the weight value of a requested course is simply defined as:
wij = m− j+ 1 (∀i | bi ∈ B) (8)
where m is the number of courses (m = |C |). This simple function ensures that the requested courses with the same rank
have equal positive weights among all the bids.
As seen from the objective function given in Eq. (1), there are two objectives of the model: the first objective is to
maximize the number of satisfied bids according to bid weight values and the second objective is for each satisfied bid
to add one requested course with the maximum possible weight. In order to maximize the total satisfaction of students,
the first objective is favored against the second objective so that when finding the optimum solution among the feasible
solutions, the solution with the maximum sum of the bid weights is chosen as the optimum. However, if there are multiple
solutions with the same maximum sum of the bid weights, then the solution with the maximum sum of the weights of the
requested courses is chosen among these solutions. In order to provide this feature, the ranges of these two types of weights
should be separated in order to cancel the effects of the latter to the former. For this purpose, a constant factor α for scaling
the sum of the weights of the requested courses is introduced in the objective function. The α factor is defined as follows:
α = 1
(|B| − 1) ·m . (9)
The following proposition proves that using these weight functions and the α value, the first objective of the model is
favored against the second objective.
Proposition 1. Given any two different feasible solutions with different sums of the bid weights for the direct barter model, the
solution with higher sum of the bid weights has higher objective value according to Eq. (1) independent of weights of the requested
courses.
Proof. Let B1 and B2 be two sets of satisfiable bids that correspond to any two feasible solutions for the direct barter model,
and z1 and z2 be the corresponding objective values such that
z1 =
−
∀i|bi∈B1
wi + α −
∀j|(aij,wij)∈Ri∧yij=1
wij
 and z2 = −
∀i|bi∈B2
wi + α −
∀j|(aij,wij)∈Ri∧yij=1
wij
 . (10)
Wewill show that if the sumof the bidweights of theB1 is greater than the sumof the bidweights of the B2, then the objective
value z1 is always greater than the objective value z2. Therefore, we will be proving that for any two feasible solutions, the
solution with the higher sum of the bid weights has higher objective value independent of the sum of the weights of the
requested courses.
Suppose that the sum of the bid weights of the B1 is greater than the sum of the bid weights of the B2,−
∀i|bi∈B1
wi >
−
∀i|bi∈B2
wi. (11)
The difference between the sums of the bid weights of B1 and B2 is −
∀i|bi∈B1
wi −
−
∀i|bi∈B2
wi

= 2k (k ∈ Z+ ∪ {0}). (12)
Then, the difference between the objective values z1 and z2 is
z1 − z2 = 2k + α ·
 −
∀i|bi∈B1
−
∀j|(aij,wij)∈Ri∧yij=1
wij −
−
∀i|bi∈B2
−
∀j|(aij,wij)∈Ri∧yij=1
wij
 . (13)
Since exactly one requested course is added for each satisfied bid, the lower bound for the sum of the requested course
weights of B1 is−
∀i|bi∈B1
−
∀j|(aij,wij)∈Ri∧yij=1
wij ≥ min
i,j
wij = 1. (14)
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Because of the conditional proof assumption in Eq. (11), B1 cannot be a subset of B2, and therefore the upper bound for the
sum of the requested course weights of B2 is−
∀i|bi∈B2
−
∀j|(aij,wij)∈Ri∧yij=1
wij ≤ (|B| − 1) ·max
i,j
wij = (|B| − 1) ·m. (15)
Therefore, −
∀i|bi∈B1
−
∀j|(aij,wij)∈Ri∧yij=1
wij −
−
∀i|bi∈B2
−
∀j|(aij,wij)∈Ri∧yij=1
wij
 ≥ 1− (|B| − 1) ·m. (16)
Using α = 1/(|B| − 1) ·m, the smallest difference between the objective values is:
z1 − z2 ≥ 20 + 1
(|B| − 1) ·m · [1− (|B| − 1) ·m] (17)
z1 − z2 ≥ 1
(|B| − 1) ·m (18)
z1 − z2 ≥ 0. (19)
Therefore, the solution with the higher sum of the bid weights has higher objective value independent of the sum of the
weights of the requested courses. 
In general, as the number of courses with remaining quotas increases, the number of solutions with identical values in
the first summand of the objective function is likely to increase. The reason is that for satisfiable bids therewill bemore than
one alternative requested course that can be added. Hence, the weight mechanism for the requested courses and α factor
mechanism will play an important role for increasing the satisfaction of students in these cases by enabling their favored
courses to be added to their schedule.
4. Solution procedure
Since the direct barter model can be formulated using integer programming, its problem instances can be solved using
general purpose integer programming solvers. However, resemblance of thismodel to the used car salesmanproblem (UCSP)
in [22] and the polynomial time barter models in [23,24] motivated us to search for a network flow based solution. Because
of the bid weights and the recursive definition of bid satisfiability that causes circular patterns in the solution like UCSP,
we modeled the direct barter problem as a minimum cost flow problem [1]. The minimum cost flow problem is defined
as follows: let N(V , A, l, u, c, b) denote a network with node set V , arc set A, lower bound l(v,w), capacity u(v,w), cost
c(v,w) values for each arc (v,w) ∈ A, and supply/demand values b(v) for each node v ∈ V . Let x(v,w) represent the flow
on arc (v,w) ∈ A. The minimum cost flow problem is defined as follows:
Minimize
−
∀v,w|(v,w)∈A
c(v,w) · x(v,w) (20)
s.t.
−
∀w|(v,w)∈A
x(v,w)−
−
∀w|(w,v)∈A
x(w, v) = b(v) (∀v | v ∈ V ) (21)
l(v,w) ≤ x(v,w) ≤ u(v,w) (∀v,w | (v,w) ∈ A) (22)
where
∑
∀v|v∈V b(v) = 0.
To help us in defining the network in our problem formally, we first introduce a set P , called restriction-pairs set, which
consists of course–student pairs. The set P is defined as follows:
P = {(ck, sl)|ck ∈ C ∧ sl ∈ S ∧ (∃i, i′, j, j′ | i ≠ i′ ∧ bi, bi′ ∈ Bl ∧ (ck, wij) ∈ Ri ∧ (ck, wi′j′) ∈ Ri′)}.
Thus, each pair (ck, sl) in P indicates that the student sl requests the course ck in his at least two different bids, and therefore
the student sl must be prevented from adding the course ck more than once in the final solution. Based on this definition,
the minimum cost flow network can be constructed as follows:
• The set of nodes, V , consists of four types of nodes:
(i) a course node ck for each course ck ∈ C ,
(ii) a special node CENTER that represents the null course to be dropped for add bids,
(iii) a bid node bi for each bid bi ∈ B,
(iv) a restriction node rkl for each (ck, sl) ∈ P for preventing the student sl from adding the course ck more than once.
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Fig. 2. Minimum cost flow network of the example given in Section 2 with (capacity, cost) values on the arcs. The solution is shown with the bold arcs
where one unit of flow passes in each bold arc.
• The set of arcs, A, consists of seven types of arcs:
(i) an arc (ck, CENTER) for each course ck ∈ C with capacity equal to qck and cost equal to 0 which represents the
remaining quota of the course ck,
(ii) an arc (CENTER, ck) for each course ck ∈ C with capacity equal to+∞ and cost equal to ϵ,
(iii) an arc (di, bi) for each barter and drop-unless-barter bid bi = (di, wi, Ri) with capacity equal to 1 and cost equal to
−wi,
(iv) an arc (CENTER, bi) for each add bid bi = (c∅, wi, Ri)with capacity equal to 1 and cost equal to−wi,
(v) for each course ck ∈ C and for each student sl ∈ S such that (ck, sl) ∈ P:
(a) an arc (bi, rkl) for each bid bi = (di, wi, Ri) ∈ Bl if there exists a tuple (ck, wij) ∈ Ri with capacity equal to 1 and
cost equal to −α · wij, (i.e. ∀i, j, k, l | sl ∈ S ∧ ck ∈ C ∧ bi ∈ Bl ∧ (aij, wij) ∈ Ri ∧ ck = aij ∧ (ck, sl) ∈ P: an arc
(bi, rkl)),
(b) an arc (rkl, ck) with capacity equal to 1 and cost equal to 0, (i.e. ∀k, l | sl ∈ S ∧ ck ∈ C ∧ (ck, sl) ∈ P: an arc
(rkl, ck)),
(vi) for each course ck ∈ C and for each student sl ∈ S such that (ck, sl) ∉ P:
(a) an arc (bi, ck) for each bid bi = (di, wi, Ri) ∈ Bl if there exists a tuple (ck, wij) ∈ Ri with capacity equal to 1 and
cost equal to −α · wij, (i.e. ∀i, j, k, l | sl ∈ S ∧ ck ∈ C ∧ bi ∈ Bl ∧ (aij, wij) ∈ Ri ∧ ck = aij ∧ (ck, sl) ∉ P: an arc
(bi, ck))
(vii) an arc (bi, CENTER) for each drop-unless-barter bid bi ∈ Dwith capacity equal to 1 and cost equal towi.
Lower bounds l(v,w) for all arcs (v,w) ∈ A are set to 0. Similarly, there is no supply or demand for any node in the network,
and therefore b(v) = 0 for every node v ∈ V . Note that ϵ which is used as the cost of the arcs of type (ii) is the smallest
possible positive number representable on the computer. It is used to prevent zero cost cycles.
The minimum cost flow network for the example problem given in Section 2 and its solution can be seen in Fig. 2. As
stated earlier, all drop bids should always be satisfied and since they are always part of the solution, they need not to be
included in the network. Therefore, before constructing the network, as a preprocessing step all drop bids are marked as
satisfied and the remaining quotas of the courses are increased accordingly. For instance, if there are z drop bids for the
course ck, after satisfying these bids the remaining quota of the course becomes qck + z. So, when presenting the network,
we assume that there will be no drop bids in the bid set B and the set of remaining quotas Q is adjusted accordingly. This
simple preprocessing step eliminates drop bids and reduces the network size. Therefore, for the example problem, the drop
bid 8 is marked as satisfied beforehand and the quota of the course SOC 101.01 is increased by one.
Verifying the correctness of the described network is straightforward. The arcs of types (iii) and (iv) represent the binary
decision variables xi for barter and add bids respectively. Therefore, additive inverses of the bid weights, −wi, are used as
the costs of these arcs. This statement is also valid for the drop-unless-barter bids on the condition that there is no flow on
the corresponding arc of type (vii). However, if there is a flow passing through both the arc of type (iii) and the arc of type
(vii) for a drop-unless-barter bid, this means that only the drop part of the bid is satisfied. In this case, this bid is considered
as unsatisfied in accordance with the IP formulation in Section 3 and the sum of the costs of the corresponding arcs of type
(iii) and (vii) are zero. As in the case of the bid weights, additive inverses of the weights of the requested courses,−α · wij,
are used as the costs of type (v.a) and (vi.a) arcs that represent binary decision variables yij. Costs of the other arcs are zero.
Therefore, minimization of the cost yields maximization of the sum of the weights. In order to satisfy a bid, one unit of flow
must flow from the node representing the course to be dropped (for add bids, from the center node) to the node representing
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Fig. 3. Network for illustrating the usage of the restriction nodes for a course restriction set with (capacity, cost) values on the arcs.
the course to be added. The capacity limits on type (iii) and (iv) arcs ensure that only one of the requested courses is added
for each satisfied bid. Also, the capacity limits on type (v.b) arcs prevent students from registering for a course more than
once. The arcs of type (i) represent the remaining quotas of the respective courses and type (ii) arcs allow satisfaction of
barter bids when the courses to be dropped are not requested by any other satisfied bid. Finally, the arcs of type (vii) allow
barter bids which are marked as drop-unless-barter to drop the course if the bartering is not possible. Quota restrictions
of the courses are enforced using the flow conservation property of the network nodes ck that correspond to the courses.
Outgoing flow from a course node is restricted with the remaining quota (adjusted value according to the drop bids in the
preprocessing step) plus the number of satisfied bids that drop the course.
When the minimum cost flow is found on the network, winning bids can be determined by checking flow on arc types
(iii) and (iv) for barter and add bids respectively. If the flow on an arc of these types is 1, it shows that corresponding barter
or add bid is satisfied and it is in the optimum solution. Similarly, the arc of types (v.a) or (vi.a) that originates from the
winning bid determines the course to be added for that bid. Since there can only be one arc with 1 unit of flow among these
arcs, the head of this arc shows the course to be added for the winning bid.
There are strongly polynomial algorithms for solving minimum cost network flow problems such as the minimummean
cycle-canceling algorithm with time complexity O(|V |2|A|3 log |V |) [13] and the enhanced capacity scaling algorithm with
time complexity O((|A| log |V |)(|A| + |V | log |V |)) [1]. Since the minimum cost flow network for a direct barter problem
instance can be constructed in polynomial timeusing the above algorithm, the optimumsolution of the direct barter problem
can also be found in polynomial time and hence the IP formulation given in Section 3 is in P .
Extending the functionality of the restriction nodes
The function of the restriction nodes in the network is to prevent a student from registering the same course more
than once. However, the function of these nodes can be extended so that instead of a single course, any number of
disjoint course restriction sets can be defined for each student such that the student can register for at most one of
the courses in this set. This is especially useful when a student requests more than one section of the same course or
a set of conflicting courses in his at least two bids. For instance, assume that a student submits the following bids:
CMPE 250.01
w1−−→ {(CMPE 220.01,w11),(CMPE 230.01,w12),(CMPE 230.02,w13)}
CMPE 240.01
w2−−→ {(CMPE 230.01,w21),(CMPE 230.02,w22),(CMPE 322.01,w23)}
It is clear that the student cannot register for two different sections of CMPE 230 at the same time. Therefore, in order
enforce this restriction, we define a course restriction set that consists of restricted courses CMPE 230.01 and 230.02. Instead
of using separate restriction nodes for these restricted courses, a split restriction node pair is introduced for this set as shown
in Fig. 3. Then, for each bid of the student that requests at least one of the courses in this set, an arc is drawn from the
corresponding bid node to the first node of the pair. The capacity of this arc is set to 1 and the cost of this arc is set to the
additive inverse of the weight of the highest ranked restricted course in the bid. Additionally, an arc is drawn between the
pair nodeswith one unit of capacity and zero cost. This arc limits the number of restricted courses to be added to one. Finally,
for each restricted course, an arc is drawn from the second node of the pair to the corresponding course nodewith a capacity
of 1 and cost of 0. This procedure is repeated by introducing a restriction node pair for each course restriction set defined.
5. Experimental results
In order to estimate the real-world performance and the quality of the solutions of our barter model, we developed a test
case generator based on real-world student registration data obtained from the Boğaziçi University registration system [5]
for the academic year 2008–2009. Since the number of students in our university is relatively small, that is 7095, we
generated a statistical profile using the actual registration data and determined the parameters of the test case generator
accordingly so that it is capable of generating test cases for arbitrary number of students. The parameters of the test case
generator and its source code can be found in [28].
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Fig. 4. Graph of the number of students vs. running time (seconds) of the network solver.
Table 1
Running times of the network solver for the test cases (seconds).
# Students # Courses Avg. # Bids Running time (s)
mean stdev
a 7095 1158 22,700 0.57 0.03
10,000 1632 32,090 1.07 0.04
25,000 4080 80,012 3.85 0.13
50,000 8160 160,099 9.00 0.29
100,000 16,321 320,675 20.44 0.75
a This row presents the results for Boğaziçi University.
We conducted two different experiments on a dedicated 64 bit Intel Xeon 2.66 GHz workstation with 8 GB memory
using Linux operating system.We used CS2 software which contains a solver for the minimum cost flow problems based on
scaling push–relabel algorithm [8,12].
In the first experiment, a group of 20 test cases are generated for each selected number of students ranging between 7095
and 100,000. The average running time of the network solver for each group and the corresponding standard deviation are
presented in Table 1 and the associated plot is depicted in Fig. 4. As seen from the results, the solver finds the solution of
the problem instances with 100,000 students and approximately 320,000 bids in less than 21 s which is quite small. For the
case of our university, on the other hand, each instance is solved in less than one second.
In the second experiment, the solutions of our barter model are compared with the currently used FCFS based system.
The purpose of this experiment is to present the improvement in the optimum solutions of the test cases over the FCFS
approach under different occupancy rates for the courses. Thus, the importance of the introduced bartering mechanism
and the weighting mechanism could be observed. In order to simulate the FCFS system, a random permutation of the bids
in each test case is generated by preserving the preferred order of bids of each student. The bids in the permuted list are
processed one by one, simulating the way the students submit the bids to the registration system. The processing step is
straightforward; for each bid, the remaining quotas of the courses in the request set is checked in the order of students’
preferences and if one empty slot is found, the course is added to the schedule of the student. If the processed bid is a barter
bid, then the course to be dropped is also removed from his schedule and the remaining quota of that course is increased by
one. The whole simulation process is repeated up to five times for the unsatisfied bids.
The second experiment is conducted for two different numbers of students, that is 7095 and 50,000, where the number
of courses are 1158 and 8160 respectively. For each number of students, the ratio of the courses without remaining quota
to the number of all courses, called p, is varied between 0.20 and 0.99 meaning that approximately (100 · p)% of the courses
have no remaining quota. For each configuration, again a group of 20 test cases are generated. The results of this experiment
are given in Table 2.
For the test caseswith 7095 students, assuming that 20% of the courses are full, the number of satisfied bids in the solution
found by the barter model is approximately 12% higher than that of the FCFS based system. For the case of our university
where approximately 28% of the courses are full, the barter model provides 15% better results. It is remarkable that the
improvement percentage for the number of satisfied bids increases exponentially as p increases. In the extreme situation
where the courses are 99% full, approximately 2800% improvement over the FCFS system is observed. It should also be noted
that in the barter model the standard deviations are also very small relative to the mean values so that the quality of the
solutions found do not varymuch. The results of the test cases with 50,000 students are also very close to the test cases with
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Table 2
Improvements in the solutions of the barter model over the FCFS model.
# Stu. (p) # Bids # Satisfied bids (mean/stdev) # Satisfied students (mean/stdev)
FCFS Barter Impr. (%) FCFS Barter Impr. (%)
7095
0.20 22,757 18,367/148 20,642/129 12.4 6719/17 6828/15 1.6
a0.28 22,725 17,823/176 20,409/153 14.5 6674/17 6822/16 2.2
0.40 22,685 16,847/184 19,905/155 18.2 6605/23 6820/12 3.2
0.60 22,761 14,224/260 18,656/140 31.2 6322/39 6814/14 7.8
0.80 22,729 9174/437 17,212/190 88.0 5329/128 6812/16 27.9
0.90 22,723 5103/497 16,300/116 224 3737/267 6760/23 82
0.95 22,745 2660/503 16,050/163 523 2249/356 6671/24 203
0.99 22,726 556/123 15,569/151 2827 537/114 6580/25 1178
50,000
0.20 160,226 129,495/513 145,312/405 12.2 47,285/53 48,040/47 1.6
0.40 160,312 118,538/595 140,396/407 18.4 46,469/68 48,033/37 3.4
0.60 160,319 100,492/1138 131,704/506 31.1 44,625/167 48,039/41 7.7
0.80 160,274 64,312/1330 121,217/416 88.6 37,416/383 48,017/55 28.3
0.90 160,052 35,624/1321 115,162/326 223 26,203/691 47,675/57 82
0.95 160,477 18,984/994 113,228/345 498 16,084/731 47,010/72 193
0.99 160,276 3597/507 109,539/298 3003 3480/476 46,300/43 1254
a This row presents the results for Boğaziçi University.
Fig. 5. Graph comparing the number of satisfied students in the solutions of the barter model and the FCFS model.
7095 students showing that the model is scalable to the universities with higher number of students without sacrificing the
quality of the solutions.
By virtue of the weighting mechanism, the barter model also improves fairness among the students by increasing not
only the number of satisfied bids but also the number of satisfied students. As seen from the plot in Fig. 5, the number
of satisfied students in the barter model whose at least one bid is satisfied is approximately 96% of the total number of
students and decreases slightly to 93% as p goes to 0.99. However, in the FCFS model, starting from 95%, this ratio drops
to 7%.
6. Previous work
As stated earlier, the CT and SS problems have been covered extensively in the literature. Some studies have addressed
solely the CT problem; several integer linear programming [3,9,18] models and heuristic methods [3,9,15] have been
proposed. For the SS problem, Reeves and Hickman [25] and Willoughby and Zappe [30] have proposed a mixed integer
and network programming models respectively, and Alvarez-Valdes et al. [2] have applied Tabu search techniques. In
[16,26], on the other hand, unified optimization models that address both problems are presented. There are also open
source (for example [29]) and commercial packages (for example [17]) that address these problems. For further details on
these problems, the reader is referred to surveys by Burke and Petrovic [6], Carter and Laporte [7], Lewis [20] and Schaerf
[27].
In the remaining of this section, we first review Graves et al.’s work [14] in detail which has addressed the student course
add/drop process aswe do in this paper. Then, in Section 6.2,we discuss the relationship between ourmodel and a somewhat
related problem called the stable college admission problem (SCAP) [10,4].
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6.1. Relationship between Graves et al.’s work and the barter model
Graves et al. [14] propose an auction based market approach complete with clearing prices for allocating course sections
to students. Their model consists of two rounds. In the first registration round, which is called registration bidding system
(RBS), students are granted bidding points (i.e. registration money) which they can use to bid on desired schedules. During
this period, students are allowed to place course selections as their bids together with the money they will pay for each
schedule. The bids are ranked in descending order of bidding points and are selected if requested course capacities are
available. At the end of the registration period, the prices of the courses are determined. Each successful bidder pays the sum
of the prices of the assigned courses to him instead of the price he offered for his bid. Therefore, it is possible that a successful
bidder may not have enough money in which case a subsidy given by the system covers the deficiency. Subsidies not paid
back during add/drop phase as a result of dropping courses are simply forgotten (waived) by the system. Hence, we believe
that if this fact is known by the students, then it could easily be abused by offering high prices for their schedules. Since
the winning bids can be subsidized and the subsidized amounts can be forgotten, this then introduces fairness problems in
Graves et al.’s approach.
In the second round, which is called drop/add/swap (DAS) round, Graves et al. introduce a course swapping idea. This
corresponds to the barter scheme that we propose in this paper. As in the RBS round, an auction based approach is used.
Students submit add, drop and swap bids together with the amounts of bidding points that are carried forward from the RBS
round (if any). After the end of the round, a linear program whose objective is to maximize the sum of the bidding points of
the satisfied bids is solved. By solving the linear program, the students are assigned to the courses and also the prices of the
courses in terms of bidding points (dual prices) are determined. As in the registration round, each student pays the actual
amounts of his satisfied bids calculated according to the determined prices of the courses. However, in this case it is stated
that subsidies are not allowed. Since there is no formal treatment for this problem except for a simple linear programming
example, it is not clear how the restriction for preventing the subsidies is applied in their model. This also prevents one from
implementing their model. Although, by the definition of dual prices, the actual amount to be paid for each satisfied bid is
bounded by the offered price for that bid, this does not solve the subsidy problem since each student may submit more than
one bid. Thus, a further constraint is necessary. In fact, the following proposition shows that introducing a budget constraint
in order to prevent subsidies, i.e. the sumof the bidding points of the satisfied bids of a student should be less than or equal to
the amount of bidding points owned by that student, to the given linear programming examplemakes the resulting problem
NP-hard. It should be noted that the formal definition of the DAS problem given below is constructed by us according to the
linear programming example and the explanations given in [14].
Proposition 2. The decision version of the DAS problem with budget constraint is NP-complete.
Proof. LetΠ be the decision version of the DAS problem with budget constraint.Π is defined as follows: given
• a set of courses, C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm};• a sequence of remaining quotas, Q = {qc1 , qc2 , . . . , qcm}where qck is the remaining quota of course ck (1 ≤ k ≤ m, qck ∈
Z+ ∪ {0});
• a set of students, S = {s1, s2, . . . , st};• a set of bids, B = tl=1 Bl where Bl is the set of bids of a student sl (1 ≤ l ≤ t) and each bid is denoted by a triplet,
bi = (di, ai, pi), where di is the course to be dropped for barter and drop bids or the null course, c∅, for add bids
(di ∈ C ∪ {c∅}), ai is the course to be added for barter and add bids or the null course, c∅, for drop bids (ai ∈ C ∪ {c∅}),
and pi is the amount of bidding points offered by the student for bid bi(1 ≤ i ≤ n = |B|, pi ∈ Z+ ∪ {0});• a set of bid restrictions, L = {l1, l2, . . . , lz} that consists of mutually disjoint subsets of bids, ly ⊆ B (1 ≤ y ≤ z), such
that at most one of the bids in ly can be satisfied (e.g. a student may put a restriction on two of his add bids so that only
one of them can be satisfied or the system may enforce a restriction on two barter bids of a student in which the same
course is dropped);
• a sequence of bidding points owned by students, F = {f1, f2, . . . , ft} where fl is the amount of bidding points owned by
student sl (1 ≤ l ≤ t, fl ∈ Z+ ∪ {0});• a positive integer K ;
is there a subset B′ ⊆ B such that the following inequalities are satisfied?−
∀i|bi∈B′
pi ≥ K (23)
−
∀i|bi∈(Bl∩B′)
pi ≤ fl (∀l | sl ∈ S) (24)
−
∀i|bi∈B′∧ai=ck
1−
−
∀i|bi∈B′∧di=ck
1 ≤ qck (∀k | ck ∈ C) (25)−
∀i|bi∈(ly∩B′)
1 ≤ 1 (∀y | ly ∈ L). (26)
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In this formulation, Eq. (23) ensures that the sum of the offered bidding points for all satisfied bids (B′) is greater than or
equal to the positive integer K . Eq. (24) is the budget constraint which prevents the sum of the bidding points of the satisfied
bids of a student from exceeding the amount of bidding points owned by that student. The quota restrictions are enforced
in Eq. (25). For each course, the number of students who drop the course plus the remaining quota of the course should be
greater than or equal to the number of students who add the course. Finally, Eq. (26) ensures that bid restrictions are applied
such that for all y (1 ≤ y ≤ z), at most one of the bids in ly ∈ L is satisfied.
If we have a certificate that consists of B′ ⊆ B, this certificate can be verified in polynomial time by checking Eqs. (23)–
(26). ThereforeΠ is in NP.
Next, we present a polynomial time transformation from the subset sum problem. Let Π ′ be the subset sum problem
(see for example: [19, p. 73] and [11, p. 247]) which is defined as follows: given a finite set U , a weight valuew(ui) ∈ Z+ for
each ui ∈ U (1 ≤ i ≤ |U|), and positive integers C and K , is there a subset U ′ ⊆ U such that−
∀i|ui∈U ′
w(ui) ≥ K (27)
−
∀i|ui∈U ′
w(ui) ≤ C . (28)
LetΠ ′(U, w(ui), C, K) be an instance of the subset sum problem. It can be transformed toΠ in polynomial time as follows:
let the set of courses C consist of |U| courses (C = {c1, c2, . . . , c|U|}) and the remaining quotas of all the courses be 1
(qck = 1, k = 1, 2, . . . , |U|). The students set S consists of 1 student (S = {s1}) and for each ui ∈ U , the student s1 submits
an add bid bi requesting the course ci with a price ofw(ui) (i = 1, 2, . . . , |U|). The amount of bidding points of the student
s1 is C (F = {C}). Let the set of bid restrictions, L, be empty. Since in each bid exactly one unique course is requested and the
remaining quotas of all the courses are 1, Eq. (25) always holds independent of the set B′. Thus, for the transformed problem
instances, Eqs. (23)–(26) reduce to the inequalities of the subset sum problem:−
∀i|bi∈B′
w(ui) ≥ K (29)
−
∀i|bi∈B′
w(ui) ≤ C (30)
and therefore, the solution of a problem instance ofΠ is also the solution of the corresponding problem instance ofΠ ′, and
the solution of a problem instance ofΠ ′ is also the solution of the problem instance ofΠ .
Since Π is in NP and the subset sum problem is NP-complete, the decision version of the DAS problem with dynamic
credit constraint is NP-complete. 
Besides the subsidy and the associated unfairness problems in Graves et al. approach, students are also responsible
for deciding the prices of the bids according to certain upper and lower bounds. However, determining the prices can be
cumbersome for the students because of the combinatorial nature of the model. Furthermore, since the remaining points
of the students are transferred to the next semester, decision making will become tougher since the students should also
consider the following semesters. Finally, we note that although the students’ perception of the quality of their schedules is
not quantified, Graves et al. estimate one percent increase in the quality of schedules using their model.
6.2. Relationship with the stable university admission problem
The preference based ordering of bids and requested courses indicates a relationship between the direct barter model
and the stable college admission problem (SCAP) [10,4]. In the SCAP, there are two sets of agents, colleges and students. Each
college has strict preferences over the students and can accept a limited number of students. Each student, on the other hand,
can enroll to only one college and has also strict preferences over the colleges. The SCAP is defined as finding a matching
of students to colleges, called a stable allocation, such that no unmatched pair of opposite agents would simultaneously be
better off if they were matched together.
In general, the SCAP cannot be used to solve our barter model. However, if we consider a simple special case of ourmodel
in which only add bids are allowed and the weights of the bids are unique, then this simple problem can be reduced to the SCAP
as follows1: let the set of bids B and the set of courses C in our barter model map to the row agents I (students), and the
column agents J (colleges) in [4] respectively. The function π(i, j) in the SCAP indicates whether student i wants to admit
to college j or not. Therefore, for each bid bi ∈ B and for each course ci ∈ C in our model, if ci is requested in bid bi, then
π(i, j) is set to 1. Otherwise, it is set to 0. For each bid bi ∈ B in our model, the weights of the requested courses correspond
to the strict college preference of the student i. For each course ck ∈ C in our model, the weights of the bids that request
1 Note that the latter requirement cannot be satisfiedwhen the bidweight function in Eq. (7) is used. Therefore, even the instances of direct bartermodel
consisting of add bids cannot be reduced to the SCAP.
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the course ck correspond to the strict student preference of the college j. In the SCAP, each student i can enroll at most s(i)
colleges and each college j can accept d(j) students. In our model, since only one course can be assigned to a bid bi, we set
s(i) = 1. However, a course ck can be assigned to qck students, and therefore we set d(j) = qck . Then, the ‘‘college optimal’’
deferred acceptance procedure [10] produces a stable allocation in which the courses are assigned to the bids in such a way
that the bid weights are favored against the weights of the requested courses. However, the stable allocation found by the
deferred acceptance procedure can be different from the allocation found by the direct barter model since the direct barter
model does not seek a stable allocation but an allocation that maximizes total satisfaction of students. For instance, assume
that the following two add bids are submitted:
Student 1 (bid 1): c∅ → {course A, course B}
Student 2 (bid 2): c∅ → {course A}
Suppose that the weight of the first bid is higher than that of the second bid. Then, the deferred acceptance procedure
would assign course A to Student 1 which is the only stable allocation. However, using the direct barter model both bids
would be satisfied and Student 1 would get course B and Student 2 would get course A.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have modeled the course add/drop process as a direct bartering problem in which add/drop requests
appear as bids.We formulated the resulting problem as an integer linear program, and then showed that our problem can be
solved in polynomial time as aminimumcost network flowproblem. In ourmodel, we also introduced a two-levelweighting
mechanism that enables students to express their preferences for their bids and for the requested courses. The weighting
mechanism also improves fairness among the students. As demonstrated with the experimental results, the minimum cost
flow network solvers can solve problem instances for a typical university within seconds. Hence, our algorithms can be
deployed in universities with hundreds of thousands of studentswithoutworrying about execution times. The experimental
results also show significant improvement in the quality of the solutions over the currently used FCFS based system while
preserving the fairness, and hencewebelieve that the direct barteringmodelwill greatly improve the satisfaction of students
in the universities.
As a final note, the real-life performance of our problem alsomotivates us to apply the direct barter approach to different
application areas. For instance, an electronic exchange that facilitates bartering e-media such as e-books, music and movies
on the Internet can be designed in a similar manner.
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